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contemptible inauthenticity in view of thingly being, which is supposed to be dynamic in
itself, to  occur , the reified world is considered unworthy, as it were, of transformation;
the critique of relativism is exorbitantly raised into the denunciation of the progressive
rationality of Western thought, including subjective reason. The time-tested hue and cry
already being raised in the public opinion against the subversive intellect allies itself with
the one against what is materially [dinghaft] alienated: both ever played to the other.
Heidegger is at once hostile towards things and anti-functional. At no price is being
supposed to be a thing and yet, as the metaphor indicates over and over again, the  soil ,
something solid.24 Therein becomes apparent, that subjectivization and reification do not
merely diverge, but are correlates. The more that which is cognized becomes
functionalized as the product of cognition, the more completely the moment of movement
in it is reckoned to the subject as its activity; the object, to the result of the labor
congealed in it, something dead. The reduction of the object to mere material, which
precedes all subjective synthesis as its necessary condition, sucks its own dynamic out of
it; it is immobilized as something disqualified, robbed of whatever would allow
movement to be predicated. It is not for nothing that Kant named a whole class of
categories as dynamic.25 The material however, exclusive of dynamics, is no mere
immediacy but, despite the appearance [Schein] of its absolute concreity, mediated
through abstraction, first pierced through, as it were. Life is polarized according to that
which is entirely abstract and entirely concrete, while it would exist solely in the tension
between them; both poles are equally reified, and even what is left of the spontaneous
subject, the pure apperception, ceases to be a subject through its dissolution from every
living I, as Kant thought of the I, and passes over in its logicity, autonomized, into the
hegemonic paralysis. Only, Heidegger s critique of reification summarily charges the
reflecting and realizing intellect of what has its origin in reality, which is itself reified
along with its world of experience. What the Spirit does, is not the fault of its irreverent
presumptuousness, but it gives back, what it is compelled to by the context of reality, in
which it itself forms only a moment. To slide back reification into being and the history
of being, thereby mourning as fate and consecrating what self-reflection and the praxis it
can spark would perhaps like to change, is solely untruth. Indeed the doctrine of being
hands down, legitimately against positivism, what the entire history which it slanders
grounded, notably Kant and Hegel: that the dualism of the inner and outer, of subject and
object, of essence and appearance, of concept and fact are not absolute. Their
reconciliation however is projected onto the irretrievable origin and thereby the dualism
itself, against which the whole was conceived, is hardened contrary to the reconciling
impulse. The dirge over the forgetfulness of being is the sabotage of reconciliation; the
mythic impenetrable history of being, in which hope still clings, denies this. Its fatality is
to be broken through as the context of deception.
False Need 99-100
This context of deception extends however not only to the ontological drafts but just as
much to the needs, to which they are bound and out of which they indistinctly read
something like the surety of their theses. Need itself, the intellectual one not less than the
material one, is open to critique, since even hard-boiled naivete can no longer be certain
that social processes are still directed immediately towards supply and demand, and
thereby towards needs. As little as these are something invariant, non-deducible, so little
do they guarantee their satisfaction. The appearance [Schein] in them and the illusion,
that where they register themselves, they must also be sated, goes back to the same false
consciousness. Insofar as they are produced heteronomously, they have a share in
ideology, were they ever so tangible. Indeed that which is real is not to be cleanly peeled
out of the ideological, if the critique does not wish for its part to succumb to ideology,
that of the simple natural life. Real needs can objectively be ideologies, without rendering
this as a legal mandate to negate them. For in the needs themselves something reacts in
the human beings who are recorded [erfassten] and administered, wherein they are not
entirely recordings [erfasst sind], the surplus of the subjective share, which the system
did not entirely master. Material needs ought to be taken seriously even in their topsy-
turvy form, caused by overproduction. Even the ontological need has its real moment in a
condition in which human beings do not have the capacity to rationally  meaningfully 
know or recognize the necessity which alone rules their behavior. The false
consciousness of needs aims at something which self-aware subjects would not need, and
compromises thereby every possible fulfillment. To false consciousness can be added,
that it passes off what is unattainable as attainable, complementarily to the possible
attainment of needs, which it is forbidden. At the same time these sorts of inverted needs
intellectually demonstrate the suffering unaware of itself in material privation. It must
push for its abolition, as much as the need by itself fails to do so. The thought without
need, which wants nothing, would be nugatory; but thinking out of the need becomes [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]